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• In the 
Carroll County Education Association, Inc. 
v. Board of Education of Carroll County 
M
aryland's state and local govern-
ments provide many services 
to Maryland citizens. The 
quantity and quality of these services 
depends in no small part on the salaries 
and working conditions state and local 
employers must provide to the labor 
force that performs these services. 
Although state and local government 
employees are unionized, they do not 
enjoy all of the benefits and advantages 
of unionization enjoyed by their private 
sector counterparts. In private business, 
negotiations between employers and 
unions typically take place behind 
closed doors; whereas, in the public 
sector, citizens feel that they ought to 
have the right to attend labor negotia-
tions that affect the quantity and 
quality of public services. 
Prior to the recent decision of the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Carroll County Education Association, 
Inc. v. Board of Education of Carroll 
County, 1 Maryland law gave no clear 
answer to the question whether a 
government employer, such as the 
Board of Education of Carroll County 
(Board), had the right, in its own 
discretion, to open labor negotiations 
with its employee unions to the public, 
or whether the Board had to bargain 
with the union on the issue of whether 
to hold open meetings. Carroll County 
placed the issue squarely before the 
court when the Carroll County Teacher's 
Association (Association) sought a 
declaratory judgment against the Board 
declaring that the Board's unilateral 
resolution to open labor negotiations to 
the public was void. 
The lower court granted the Board's 
motion for summary judgment and 
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held that the Board had no legal duty to 
bargain with its union on the issue of 
open meetings. On appeal, the court of 
appeals affirmed this decision and 
based its holding primarily on Mary-
land's Open Meeting Act (OMA),2 
which generally requires that all meet-
ings of public bodies be open to the 
public. "Collective bargaining," the 
term applied to labor negotiations 
between employers and employee 
unions is an exception to the OMA 
open meeting requirement. According 
to § II(a)(8) of the OMA, collective 
bargaining sessions with public sector 
unions "may" be closed to the public. 3 
Nevertheless, the appellate court found 
that the discretion to close labor 
negotiations to the public lay solely 
with the public employer. 
This article examines the distinctions 
between public and private sector labor 
relations and the impact that Carroll 
County may have on public sector labor 
relations. 
Statutes Construed 
The conflicting statutes that formed 
the basis of the Carroll County opinion 
were the OMA and the Public Em-
ployee's Labor Relations Act (PERLA).4 
The Board argued that the OMA gave it 
the right to open meetings in their sole 
discretion. The Association argued that 
allowing the Board to hold open 
meetings without first discussing the 
matter with the union constituted a 
failure to bargain in "good faith," a 
violation of § 6-408 of PERLA, which 
states that upon request by the em-
ployee union, a public school employer 
must confer in good faith at all 
reasonable times with the employee 
organization.5 
In deciding the issue in favor of the 
Board, the court held that the Board's 
unilateral decision to hold open meet-
ings did not violate the PERLA good 
faith requirement, which only requires 
that a public employer come to the bar-
gaining table with an open mind, pre-
pared to negotiate. The court also based 
its holding on § 15 of the OMA, which 
states that in the event of "any conflict 
between this subtitle and other provi-
sions of law relating to meetings of pub-
lic bodies this subtitle shall apply. "6 
The court resolved the conflict between 
the OMA and PERLA in favor of open 
meetings. 
Open Meetings vs. Collective 
Bargaining 
In Carroll County, the court of ap-
peals recognized the differences be-
tween public and private sector labor 
negotiations. One major difference is 
that, in the pri vate sector, market forces 
greatly influence collective bargaining. 
On the other hand, in the public sector, 
legislative and political forces influence 
collective bargaining and add non-
economic considerations to the bar-
gaining process. 
A second fundamental distinction 
between public and private sector labor 
relations is that strikes in the public sec-
tor are generally prohibited? because 
public services (such as police protec-
tion), unlike most private sector services 
and products, are indispensable. More-
over, public sector strikes threaten state 
sovereignty.8 
A third distinction is the difference 
in the legal status of agreements be~ 
tween employers and their unions in 
the public and private sectors. Labor 
agreements negotiated in the private 
sector are legally binding upon execu~ 
tion by the parties. In the public sector, 
however, all final decisions are left to 
the public employer,9 and agreements 
are always subject to renegotiation in 
the event the legislature fails to allocate 
sufficient funds to finance the agree~ 
ment.lO Thus, it may be unrealistic to 
compare public sector collective bar~ 
gaining with collective bargaining in the 
private sector. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
approached Carroll County mindful of 
these distinctions and recognized that 
its decision would impair the public 
sector collective bargaining mechanism. 
In allowing open bargaining sessions, 
the court understood that it was weak~ 
ening the union's bargaining position: 
at open meetings, public opinion ordi~ 
narily favors management because union 
demands, such as higher salaries, usually 
result in reductions in public services 
or higher taxes. Therefore, citizens 
attending open meetings often pressure 
unions to temper their demands. 
In reaching its decision, the court ex~ 
amined statistics suggesting that open 
meetings inhibit discussion and the free 
interplay of ideas that take place at 
closed meetings. The court's decision to 
permit open meetings, in the face of 
these statistics, indicates that the court 
gave greater weight to the benefits ac~ 
cruing to the public through open meet~ 
ings than to the potential impairment of 
the public sector collective bargaining 
process. 
Effect on Maryland Law 
Despite the many differences be~ 
tween public and private sector labor 
negotiations, the Association in Carroll 
County argued that the court should 
apply the same standards to the public 
sector that it would apply in a private 
sector labor case, in keeping with Mary~ 
land's tradition to follow private sector 
precedents in public sector labor 
cases'! I The court was not persuaded 
and allowed the Board the discretion to 
insist on open meetings as a prerequi~ 
site to further negotiations or reaching a 
final agreement. 
In the private sector, insistence on a 
topic of negotiation that does not in~ 
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volve wages, hours or working condi~ 
tions is strictly prohibited. 12 Thus, by 
allowing the Board to insist on open 
meetings (a topic not dealing with 
wages, hours or working conditions), 
the Carroll County decision marks a 
clear break with the tradition of follow~ 
ing private sector precedents in public 
sector cases. 
This aspect of the case should be 
restricted to its facts, however. In Carroll 
County, a statutory basis existed for al~ 
lowing the Board to insist on a subject 
not involving wages, hours or working 
conditions. In cases where statutory 
justification does not exist, courts 
should apply private sector precedents 
to public sector labor law cases and al~ 
low as close an adherence to true collec~ 
tive bargaining as is feasible in the pub~ 
lie sector. 
Impact on Collective Bargaining 
The general purpose of collective 
bargaining is to encourage a harmon~ 
ious relationship between management 
and employees, as it is generally recog~ 
nized that "refusals to confer and nego~ 
tiate had been one of the most prolific 
causes of industrial strife."13 Therefore, 
collective bargaining should be encour~ 
aged whenever possible. 
Despite its sound basis, the rationale 
of Carroll County has been criticized by 
the majority of courts, commentators 
and labor boards that have addressed 
the issue. The general view is that open 
labor negotiations in the public sector 
damage the collective bargaining 
mechanism established by legislatures 
to benefit public employees. The 
Carroll County court balanced the 
competing considerations of open 
meetings and collective bargaining in 
favor of open meetings; whereas, most 
commentators, courts and labor boards 
favor collective bargaining, which they 
consider to be more conducive to 
industrial peace and increased indus~ 
trial productivity. 14 
Critics of the Carroll County rationale 
point out that open meetings suppress 
free and open discussion, cause pro~ 
ceedings to become formalized rather 
than spontaneous, induce rigidity and 
posturing, create the false impression 
that compromise is a form of retreat 
and, therefore, freeze negotiators into 
fixed positions from which they cannot 
recede. ls Judge Davidson, who wrote 
the dissenting opinion in Carroll County, 
agrees that open meetings destroy the 
effectiveness of the collective bargain~ 
ing process.16 
Even though open meetings are con~ 
sidered inconsistent with collective bar~ 
gaining, nearly half of the states (includ~ 
ing Maryland) that have both open 
meeting laws and collective bargaining 
statutes limit the public's participation 
in public sector labor negotiations. 17 
Citizens may attend open meetings but 
may not particiapte in them; though the 
public may view the negotiations,18 its 
input is limited to expressing its views 
before and after, but not during meet~ 
ings. This limited participation balances 
the harshness of the open meeting 
requirement. 
The End Result 
The effects of open meetings on col~ 
lective bargaining in Maryland will 
probably be similar to those noted by a 
Florida survey that analyzed the first 
two years of Florida's open bargaining 
experiment. 19 One negative aspect of 
open bargaining noted by the survey 
was that the participants played to the 
audience. In addition, the normal ad~ 
versarial relationship between unions 
and management became even more po~ 
larised,zo As bargaining positions 
hardened, negotiations took longer, and 
the cost of bargaining increased. The 
survey, however, also noted some posi~ 
tive aspects of open meetings: union re~ 
presentatives tempered their demands 
and the public had a chance to express 
its views and prepare itself in advance 
for proposed reductions in public 
services.21 
Carroll County may have political 
consequences affecting employer / em~ 
ployee relations. Labor unions strongly 
oppose open bargaining, which they 
view as a management device to rally 
the public's support against union de~ 
mands.22 There has been very little 
strike activity in Maryland's public sec~ 
tor; however, Maryland public sector 
unions may view Carroll County as a 
threat to their bargaining power and 
may feel compelled to resort to illegal 
strikes. Thus, Carroll County may re~ 
present a step backwards by fostering 
antagonism between unions and man~ 
agement which may result in more 
strike activity. 
Carroll County represents a rational 
assessment of competing views. The 
decision fairly balances the interests of 
unionized public employees with the 
public's interest in open government. 
Although the impact of Carroll County 
may not be felt for some time, it 
relPresents a significant step in the 
refinement of a discrete body of public 
sector labor law. m 
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already mastered the skills that they are 
trying to impart and are familiar with 
the conventions of the profession. They 
know that putting legal skills into 
action can do a lot of harm. They have 
seen legal arguments intensify and even 
initiate disagreements rather than re~ 
solve them; they have seen students 
who-having just learned to say "inter 
alia" or divide their arguments into 
three numbered sections (and even 
perhaps remember the third part of the 
argument )-feel that because of these 
skills they have somehow become 
superior to other citizens; they have 
seen first~year law students disdain the 
"fuzzy" thinking of other citizens and 
even of their spouses and friends, so 
that they exhibit an aggresive over~ 
confidence that is sometimes never 
outgrown; they are well aware of judges 
who think that some special skill 
entitles them to a superior place in the 
resolution of social problems. Teachers 
may love their craft and the skills of 
their profession, but they are at least as 
aware of the limitations as anyone else. 
They spend a great deal of their 
academic effort questioning basic as~ 
sumptions about how law is used, at 
attempting to locate the limitations of 
law. They want students to master the 
techniques and then to transcend them. 
Sooner or later (and this mispercep~ 
tion tends to last indefinitely) many 
students come to believe that their 
teachers know nothing, are not there at 
all. The most common version of this 
belief is that teachers are not interested 
in practical things. Put bluntly, students 
adopt this attitude because their teachers 
insist that they continue thinking about 
problems when they are tired of them. 
Students and alumni criticize teachers 
as "too abstract," "too impractical," 
"too academic," but these are merely 
euphemisms for exasperation. Most law 
teachers have practiced law, many still 
do, and some will go back to the 
practice full time. Of course, the 
faculty's academic interests may differ 
from the students' interests from time 
to time, but there is no real doubt that 
the skills being taught are generally the 
skills needed in practice. Law students 
are taught to be precise, to develop the 
capacity to forsee potential weaknesses 
in their own arguments, to be orderly, 
to be complete, to be imaginative in the 
construction of legal arguments. These 
are the intellectual skills that the 
practice of law requires. 
Another version of the belief that the 
teacher knows nothing is the distres~ 
singly common view that law teachers 
are trying to convince their students 
that there are always two sides to every 
argument. Many law students believe 
they have seen deeply into the purposes 
of legal education when they conclude 
that anyone argument is as good as any 
other, that the important thing is just to 
be able to come up with an argument. 
Students might come to this conclusion 
because teachers tend to raise additional 
questions in response to most answers. 
The perceived message is that the 
student is to learn to make an 
argument, any argument; one must be 
as good as another since there are 
problems with all arguments. This 
perception is almost completely wrong. 
Teachers, of course, question answers 
so that students will learn to discover 
possible weaknesses in even their 
strongest arguments. Moreover, most 
teachers want students to be able to 
judge quality for themselves. They do 
not make a habit of telling students 
when their answers are "right" because 
a lawyer must learn to judge indepen~ 
dently, by his own standards, when an 
argument is good enough. The point of 
all those questions is, in fact, to show 
students how to judge quality in 
argument, not to urge the view that 
quality is irrelevant. 
I do not mean these observations to 
be self~serving. There is some truth in 
all the misperceptions that I have 
described. Every faculty member has 
many weaknesses, as does legal educa~ 
tion in general. But the misperceptions 
distort-even oppose-what I think 
most law teachers know to be true. In 
this way they illustrate how powerful is 
the urge that students feel to diminish 
their teachers. Legal education is still 
fairly rigorous, and it involves many 
real frustrations and disappointments. 
Only some of these are caused by 
faculty members. To caricature and 
ultimately to try to eliminate the 
teacher that stands in front of them is a 
way for students to make the teacher 
responsible for all the difficulties 
associated with becoming educated in 
law. Law students in this regard only 
share (and perhaps enlarge) the near 
universal desire of students to avoid 
taking responsibility for their own 
education. Sadly, like any group subject 
to fairly constant misperception, 
teachers are under pressure to in~ 
ternalize the distorted image of them~ 
selves reflected in their students' eyes. 
Much of the malaise in legal education 
today may be as much a consequence of 
the resulting personal unhappiness as it 
is of any real ineffectiveness inherent in 
prevalent teaching techniques. 
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